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ANTITRUST AND THE COSTS OF MOVEMENT
HERBERT HOVENKAMP*
Antitrust is concerned about the structure of markets as well as with the
bargaining that goes on within them. As a result, the absolute cost of rede-
ploying resources is as important as the transaction costs of arranging for their
movement. Building a new plant, refitting a facility from the production of
one product to another, or moving inputs from point A to point B may all
involve numerous transaction costs. But they also involve the nontransactional
costs of the design, engineering, or transportation that such movement
requires.
What makes antitrust policy relevant is not merely transaction costs but
also the costs of choices about initial resource deployments and subsequent
movement. At various times in its history, antitrust policy has given greater or
lesser weight to the role of transaction costs, on the one hand, rather than the
absolute costs of resource movement, on the other. For example, the antitrust
structuralism that was ascendant in the 1960s and earlier tended to see the
absolute costs of moving resources as governing many elements of economic
performance, and transactions as feeble instruments for making corrections.
At the other extreme, the orthodox Chicago School tended to see markets as
self-correcting, which is another way of saying that transacting could undo
most of the mischief that inefficient initial deployments may have brought
about. The need for government intervention was, accordingly, rare. In be-
tween the extremes are several possibilities, including “Post-Chicago” and
“Neo-Chicago” as well as “Neo-Harvard” approaches. Each of these reflects a
set of beliefs about the kinds of costs that are involved in moving resources
from a current, inferior position to a superior one or, in some cases, in
preventing resources from being deployed in an inferior position in the first
place.
Following the introduction in Part I, Part II briefly examines structuralism
as a theory underlying antitrust enforcement. The premise of structuralism
was not high transaction costs, but rather the high costs of resource movement
* Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, University of Iowa.
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generally. Part III turns to barriers to entry or rival expansion, looking particu-
larly at the differing definitions provided by Harvard and Chicago School
economists and showing why the Harvard definition is superior for antitrust
purposes. Part IV contains a brief discussion of antitrust’s two principal tests
for welfare, total welfare and consumer welfare, and how they relate to our
assumptions about the costs of movement. Typically implicit in the argument
for a general welfare test is that producer gains from a practice will move to
consumers, provided that markets are competitive and other costs of move-
ment do not serve to limit their flow. Implicit in defenses of a consumer wel-
fare test is strong doubt that this will occur.
Finally, Part V looks at various antitrust practices and considers how both
transaction costs and the more general costs of movement might play a role in
analyzing them. First, we need to rethink current antitrust doctrine about re-
fusal to deal in dominated networks, which are networks that both dominate
the markets in which they operate and are themselves dominated by a single
firm. Second, problems related to vertical integration and product comple-
mentarity are particularly prone to cost of movement analysis, particularly in
cases involving asset specificity and the possibility of double marginalization.
Finally, this essay examines some specific problems of pricing and vertical
control, looking in particular at the wide range of theoretical attacks and de-
fenses of so-called loyalty discounts and bundled discounts. In particular, it
faults the drawing of broad conclusions from models with restrictive assump-
tions and untested conclusions about the range of rivals’ or customers’
responses.
I. INTRODUCTION: RESOURCE MOVEMENT AND THE
“SCHOOLS” OF ANTITRUST
Writing in the mid-1970s, Phillip Areeda and Donald Turner (1) dismissed
claims for antitrust goals other than economic efficiency, such as fairness, as
being “vagrant”;1 (2) were fairly obsessed with error costs and problems of
administration in the recognition of exclusionary practices;2 and (3) discussed
and rejected the then-existing more adventuresome theories of above cost stra-
tegic entry deterrence, which, notwithstanding successes in modeling, were
not empirically robust and were not administrable by antitrust tribunals.3 The
debate that ensued between Areeda and Turner, on one side, and Williamson,
Baumol, and Scherer, on the other, underscored the critical but necessarily
limited role that economic assumptions play in antitrust analysis. Areeda and
1 1 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 109a (1978); see also id.
¶¶ 105–109.
2 Id. ¶¶ 713–714.
3 Id. ¶ 714.
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Turner’s critics consistently advocated more complex models of above cost
strategic behavior that they thought worthy of consideration. Areeda and Tur-
ner consistently rejected these, largely on administrability grounds.4
In those same 1978 volumes Areeda and Turner firmly rejected the “lever-
age” theory of tying arrangements and other vertical practices, in a tradition
that “Neo-Chicago” firmly claims, although with some qualifications.5 Areeda
and Turner also took a position closely resembling the Neo-Chicago position
on vertical integration by the monopolist, completely rejecting structuralist
hostility and generally developing a highly benign set of antitrust rules that
the courts have followed.6 Uncharacteristically, however, they also advocated
a purely structural, “no fault” theory of unlawful monopolization under which
the government, but not private parties, could obtain divestiture or other struc-
tural re-ordering of persistent monopolies, without any proof of anticompeti-
tive conduct.7
The Neo-Chicago assessment of dominant firm exclusionary practices
tracks Areeda and Turner’s own lack of confidence in theoretical economics
to help “juries, courts, and regulators to reason their way to the right answer.”8
Nevertheless, economics has an essential role to play. The task for antitrust is
to distinguish what is robust and administrable from that which is merely in-
teresting and provocative. In order to do antitrust one must get economics
away from the blackboard.
4 See Oliver E. Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE
L.J. 284, 292 (1977); Phillip E. Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Williamson on Predatory Pricing,
87 YALE L.J. 1337, 1348 (1978); Oliver E. Williamson, Williamson on Predatory Pricing II, 88
YALE L.J. 1183 (1979); William J. Baumol, Quasi-Permanence of Price Reductions: A Policy
for Prevention of Predatory Pricing, 89 YALE L.J. 1, 4–5 (1979); see also William J. Baumol &
Robert D. Willig, Fixed Cost, Sunk Cost, Entry Barriers, and Sustainability of Monopoly, 96 Q.J.
ECON. 405 (1981); F.M. Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 869 (1976); Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Scherer on Predatory Pricing: A Reply,
89 HARV. L. REV. 891 (1976); F.M. Scherer, Some Last Words on Predatory Pricing, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 901 (1976). The debate is recounted in 3A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 736 (3d ed. 2008); Paul L. Joskow & Alvin K. Klevorick, A Framework for
Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 213, 253–54 (1979).
5 2 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 1, ¶ 347a, b (repudiating leverage theory of tying). On
qualifications, see David S. Evans & A. Jorge Padilla, Designing Antitrust Rules for Assessing
Unilateral Practices: A Neo-Chicago Approach, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 75–78 (2005).
6 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 1, ¶ 725b, c (repudiating leverage theory of vertical inte-
gration); id. ¶ 724 (rejecting hostile view of vertical integration and finding it procompetitive in
nearly all instances); id. ¶ 725c (accepting elimination of double marginalization as procompeti-
tive rationale for vertical integration when downstream market is not competitive).
7 See id. ¶¶ 618–623. This proposal paralleled one offered by President Jimmy Carter’s Na-
tional Commission to Review Antitrust Law and Procedures. See AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF
AMERICAN ANTITRUST LAW, ch. 10 (Daniel A. Crane & Herbert Hovenkamp eds., forthcoming
2012).
8 Evans & Padilla, supra note 5, at 80.
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Those advocating a Neo-Chicago approach to antitrust emphasize several
points. First, antitrust rules should be “assessed on their consequences in
terms of efficiency.” Second, “Distinguishing procompetitive from anticom-
petitive actions with certainty is impossible.” Third, socially desirable anti-
trust rules should “minimize the expected cost of errors” from both over- and
under-identifying correctable anticompetitive situations. Fourth, an antitrust
policy aware of the problems associated with error costs would be based on
“current economic knowledge and experience” rather than the more adven-
turesome forms of economics, such as refined game theory showing that cer-
tain practices might be anticompetitive.9 Neo-Chicago is particularly critical
of the Post-Chicago willingness to accept “possibility theorems” as an alterna-
tive to more rigorous technical or empirical analysis.10 The fact that something
can be modeled does not mean that it has important policy implications or, for
that matter, that the modeled result occurs frequently or ever obtains at all.
To this I would add one additional point: Antitrust must be aware that the
cost of moving resources can be as important as the particular place where
they land, and that these cost are not limited to the cost of bargaining. Anti-
trust’s economic doctrine is based on a set of assumptions about the ease with
which resources move through the economy. In a healthy economy resources
are put to their best use. Further, they move around continuously as people die
and new ones are born, tastes and needs change, productive assets are worn
out or destroyed and replaced, innovations are created and brought to the mar-
ket, and firms exit or enter. Both individuals and many institutions move re-
sources. Resource movements occur through orderings of the resources a
person already has based on individual preferences, market exchange, govern-
ment and democratic voting processes, family gifting, inheritance, and theft,
to name a few. One feature of classical and neoclassical economics is their
largely exclusive concern with markets and individual preference orderings as
movers of resources. Resource movement theorems based exclusively on indi-
vidual preference orderings and markets, such as the First Welfare Theorem,
show that if resources can be costlessly reassigned through trading to their
9 Id. at 74–75 (developing all four propositions).
10 According to Evans and Padilla:
The post-Chicago literature is a collection of what we call “possibility theorems.” In
the vertical foreclosure strand of the literature, these theorems all begin with the as-
sumption that vertical foreclosure does not generate any benefits such as reductions in
production costs and transaction costs, or improved convenience for consumers.  The
theorems are based on further assumptions about demand, cost, and firms’ strategic
interactions. Finally, the theorems show that a practice reduces social welfare if spe-
cific parameters of the model (elasticity of demand, the magnitude of fixed costs, etc.)
fall within a particular range of values. But they are of limited practical value because
the data critical to deciding whether reality fits the models is typically unavailable.
Id. at 79–80.
2012] ANTITRUST AND THE COSTS OF MOVEMENT 71
most valuable uses the resulting economy will be Pareto efficient.11 Under
similar assumptions the same thing cannot be shown of democratic voting,
gifting, inheritance, or theft.
In the real world resources do not automatically move to their best uses.
This is because the cost of moving resources is sometimes greater than the
resulting gains. In general, the cost of moving resources is what makes legal
policy relevant, including antitrust policy. Coase famously argued this prop-
osition with respect to transaction costs.12 One of Coase’s conclusions was
that transaction costs are distinctive in the sense that the state can make policy
to compensate for high transaction costs, even though it cannot do very much
about the larger costs of moving resources. “If we move from a regime of zero
transactions costs to one of positive transactions costs, what becomes immedi-
ately clear is the crucial importance of the legal system.”13 The proper role of
legal policy, in those cases where legal policy is necessary at all, is to take the
absolute costs and values of moving resources as a given, while using the
legal system to compensate for high transaction costs by assigning rights the
way they would be assigned if transactions costs did not interfere with effi-
cient bargaining.
But in one important sense Coase’s view was too limited: One can say
precisely the same thing about the nontransactional costs of moving resources,
and also about the way resources are deployed in the first place. If they were
initially deployed in their most efficient uses then neither the cost of transact-
ing for their movement or of actually moving them would be necessary. Just
as high bargaining costs hinder the efficient deployment of resources, so too
the high costs of initial mis-assignments are a hindrance.
Prior to Coase, Arthur Cecil Pigou had argued that the cost of moving re-
sources drives policy decisions about the efficacy of moving them, but he did
not limit his observations to transaction costs as such; nor did he relate them
to the justification for a legal system. Pigou’s conception of the costs of
movement was much broader than “transaction” costs and included any cost
of getting a resource from one use to another.14
Pigou was certainly right on one point: The cost of moving resources is
hardly limited to transaction costs. For example, the cost of navigating boats
11 See, e.g., Kegon Teng Kok Tan, The First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics
(2008), available at http://www.math.uchicago.edu/~may/VIGRE/VIGRE2008/REUPapers/Tan.
pdf.
12 R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
13 R.H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 713, 717 (1992)
(Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize Lecture in Economic Sciences delivered Dec. 9, 1991).
14 A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 138–39 (4th ed. 1932); see Herbert Hovenkamp,
The Coase Theorem and Arthur Cecil Pigou, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 633, 636–40 (2009).
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down a river might be much less if a bottleneck did not force captains to
portage around it. However, if the costs of dredging the river are greater than
the gains, then this obstacle will remain. This is not fundamentally a transac-
tion cost problem because the same thing applies even if the same person
owns both the shipping company and the river. Positing that a third party
owns the riverbed at the bottleneck does not change the basic story. To be
sure, the navigators would have to reach a bargain with the land owner, so
transaction costs might interfere with dredging even if it is otherwise cost
justified. Nonetheless, questions about the social efficacy of dredging cannot
be reduced to these transaction costs; they must also consider the absolute
costs of dredging in relation to the gains. For example, if the cost of dredging
the river were $1 million while the transportation value of dredging is only
$800,000, the river will not be dredged. However, if one of these numbers
were to change, then the situation might be different. For example, the con-
struction of a large plant downriver with an important upriver source of sup-
ply might increase the transport value of dredging to $2 million, and suddenly
dredging the river acquires a positive value.
In the Coasean analysis of this situation the role of legal policy is to com-
pensate for high costs of transacting, but the nontransactional values are gen-
erally assumed as given. These costs are generally treated as part of the laws
of nature or as valuations that depend on prior economic decisions that are not
sufficiently relevant to the currently contemplated decision to warrant
concern.
For example, in Coase’s famous account of the physician and confectioner,
whose professional lives are joined together by a party wall, Coase observes
how bargaining costs might determine where the right in question will be
assigned.15 However, he is not particularly interested in the question of why
the two parties established their businesses around a party wall in the first
place, and whether legal policy should have done anything about it. For exam-
ple, a zoning statute might have prevented the confectioner’s noisy mortar
from being operated in close proximity to a physician’s office. In that case
this particular cost of movement could have been avoided.
Of course, the initial assignment of resources can also be subject to bar-
gaining. Costless bargaining by everyone affected and in some ex ante posi-
tion could result in efficient initial assignments as well. Even an individual’s
nonmarket preferences could be more efficient if made subject to cost free
bargaining. For example, if I value chartreuse as the next color for my house
but my aggregated neighbors value a more subtle color by a greater sum,
15 Sturges v. Bridgman, LR 11 Ch. D. (Eng.) 852 (1879) (discussed in R. H. Coase, The
Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 26–28 (1959); Coase, Problem of So-
cial Cost, supra note 12, at 8–10).
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perhaps they could purchase the right from me before I began painting. We
might respond by a legal rule that assigned the right in the first instance to my
neighbors, or perhaps that gave my neighbors an opportunity to bid against
me with respect to all of my personal choices that impose externalities. This
reasoning soon takes us into a place that Coase would almost certainly not
want to go, which is a society in which virtually every decision is subject in
the first instance to a kind of objectively determined cost-benefit analysis.
Nevertheless, an important purpose of the legal system is to ensure that
resources are deployed efficiently in the first instance. For example, suppose
that a resource currently at point A would have a better use at point B, in-
creasing value by $80. Two different things might hinder the resource’s
movement, $100 in bargaining costs or $100 in transport costs. Either of
these would prevent the resource from moving to the more valuable use. If the
problem is the transaction costs, the Coasean solution would be to assign the
resource to point B in the first place. Precisely the same thing is true of the
purely non-transactional transport costs, however. Welfare would be im-
proved if the resource had initially been assigned to point B rather than point A.
One place where the non-transaction costs of moving resources are impor-
tant is when we are not talking about markets at all but rather about the “inter-
nal” preference orderings of a single economic actor. An excessive focus on
transaction costs tends to obscure the fact that many resource movements do
not involve transaction costs for the simple reason that they do not involve
transactions. This can be of special relevance when we consider firm organi-
zation and unilateral conduct. To be sure, firms live in markets, but they also
make non-transactional choices about structure and choice of technology. To
the extent these choices are inframarginal they do not affect the boundaries of
the firm.16
Antitrust law is concerned mainly with the way that resources are moved by
means of markets. In some cases, however, it is also concerned about resource
allocations made internally by business firms, including but not limited to
such things as choice of technology or distribution mode. Antitrust would not
have a place in an economy where resources moved costlessly and without
any frictions from lower value to higher value uses. All markets would be
competitive, production would be optimized, as would the satisfaction of con-
sumer wants. With zero costs of movement monopolies would not exist be-
cause the losers from monopoly could substitute without cost and would do so
until all returns were equalized. The market would become efficient and the
16 At the margin, the firm’s boundaries are determined by the point of equality between the
marginal cost of internal production and the marginal cost of external procurement. See R.H.
Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). But it is hardly the case that every
decision about the structure of production lies on this margin.
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parties would divide up the gains, although possibly in a generally indetermi-
nate fashion. That is to say, there would be wealth transfers and some of these
might strike some people as unappealing, but there would not be any effi-
ciency losses.
The trick for the monopolist is to make such moves unlikely to occur,
which will happen if the cost of movement exceeds its value. The monopolist
can certainly do this by creating situations in which bargaining costs restrain a
market from moving toward a competitive equilibrium. But it can accomplish
the same thing by investment in resources for which the absolute cost of
movement, quite aside from transaction costs, exceeds the gains. Commonly,
it will do some combination of the two. Indeed, in situations where the abso-
lute costs of moving resources to a competitive position is relatively low in
relation to value, the imposition of transaction costs alone will often not be
sufficient. For example, cartels are likely to be unstable in markets that are not
structurally conducive to collusion to begin with. Specialized plants and engi-
neering constraints on entry or output have at least as much to do with cartel
success as do the transaction costs of cartel management.
II. STRUCTURALISM
“Structuralism” generally refers to the industrial organization and antitrust
policy that we associate with the Harvard economics department and law
school from the 1930s through the early 1960s.17 It showed up in antitrust
policy in the structure-conduct-performance (S-C-P) paradigm, and aggressive
antitrust enforcement heavily preoccupied with structural manifestations of
monopoly, as well as structural remedies such as divestiture. Under the S-C-P
paradigm market structure dictates conduct and conduct dictates performance.
As a result, conduct drops out as a variable of interest. In the words of one
follower, “Under the structure theory behavior is irrelevant: the law proscribes
monopoly itself and not merely monopolization; it reaches the fact of market
power rather than the manner of its exercise.”18
The most prominent characteristic of structuralism was its belief that re-
sources would not flow freely from lower to higher value uses because of
numerous market impediments. Some of these impediments could be charac-
terized as transactions costs, although most could not be. The lingering effects
of structuralism showed up in Areeda and Turner’s 1978 proposal for a law of
“no fault” monopolization, with divesture available in actions brought by the
17 See Herbert Hovenkamp, United States Competition Policy in Crisis: 1890–1955, 94 MINN.
L. REV. 311, 346–66 (2009).
18 G.E. HALE & ROSEMARY D. HALE, MARKET POWER: SIZE AND SHAPE UNDER THE SHER-
MAN ACT 89 (1958).
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government.19 The trigger for them was at least five years of substantial mo-
nopoly, indicating that resources were unlikely to flow toward a more compet-
itive equilibrium. Areeda and Turner advocated a test under which persistency
could not be established if the monopoly was less than five years old. It could
be proven, however, if the duration of the monopoly was between five and ten
years, and would be presumed if the monopoly had existed more than ten
years.20
One characteristic of both antitrust “structuralism” and the historical Chi-
cago School is that both tended to minimize the role of transaction costs,
while focusing on the broader, non-transactional costs of moving resources
from one spot to another. The two schools came at this from opposite posi-
tions. The structuralists tended to emphasize such things as structural barriers
to entry, market imperfections such as information costs or product differenti-
ation that impaired resource movement, and what they saw as the inherently
exclusionary impact of practices such as vertical integration.21 Because con-
duct was unimportant, transaction costs were not particularly important either.
In very sharp contrast, the Chicago School was much more strictly neoclas-
sical, seeing resources as moving with little to constrain them from positions
of lesser to greater value. As a result, members of the Chicago School tended
to see monopoly as relatively rare and the opportunities for increasing or ex-
tending it as rarer still. A premise of the structuralist preference for structural
relief, such as dissolution of dominant firms or breakups of mergers, was that
markets were poorly equipped to correct for these things on their own. By
contrast, the Chicago School tended to prefer no intervention at all, other than
perhaps fines or other penalties to take away the profitability of egregious
conduct.22
Today, structuralist orthodoxy and the S-C-P paradigm are dead and not
likely to rise again. The “orthodox” Chicago School is certainly not as dead,
but it has not produced the kind of excitement that it did forty years ago. It has
become commonplace to say that the Harvard School has gradually moved to
the right and the Chicago School to the left, and that the two are now almost
indistinguishable on many issues,23 and there is certainly much truth to such
19 See discussion supra text accompanying note 7.
20 See 1 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 1, ¶ 623d.
21 E.g., JOE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 223–35, 251–52, 372–86 (2d ed. 1968); see
Herbert Hovenkamp, The Law of Vertical Integration and the Business Firm: 1880–1960, 95
IOWA L. REV. 863 (2010).
22 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND
ITS PRACTICE § 17.2 (4th ed. 2011); William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Viola-
tions, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 652 (1983).
23 E.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION
35–38 (2006); William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for
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statements. In addition, the last three decades have seen a proliferation of
attempts at some kind of middle position. Within economics one speaks of
new industrial economics or transaction cost economics or even New Institu-
tional Economics. Within antitrust policy one speaks of Post-Chicago or Neo-
Chicago antitrust.24
Without detracting from the importance or usefulness of these names or the
distinctiveness of their adherents’ views, one can observe that all of them
have some important characteristics in common. First, nearly all of them re-
ject the strong form of structuralism that characterized the S-C-P paradigm
and that saw significant barriers to resource mobility. Second, all of them also
tend toward the belief that the orthodox Chicago School exaggerated the ease
with which resources move through the economy. Third, transaction costs
have assumed greatly increased importance in competition policy analysis,
although other costs of movement continue to count as well. The significance
of transaction cost analysis in antitrust has been to re-introduce a stronger
conception of the costs of movement, in general disagreement with the ortho-
dox Chicago School position. But the costs are different from the absolute
costs contemplated by the S-C-P paradigm.
III. BARRIERS TO ENTRY
A prerequisite for market power is high costs of movement, which refers
mainly to the engineering and transport costs of redeploying resources, al-
though power can also be created or enhanced by high transaction costs. On
the demand side, market power exists when it is cheaper for consumers to pay
the price than to go elsewhere and the price is significantly above cost. On the
supply side, there must be costs of movement that limit the ability of potential
rivals to compete with the firm or firms in question.
One of the great accomplishments of structuralism was Joe S. Bain’s highly
influential studies of entry barriers and the definition that he gave to them.25
Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 32,
38–39 (2007); Alan J. Meese, Debunking the Purchaser Welfare Account of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act: How Harvard Brought Us a Total Welfare Standard and Why We Should Keep It,
85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 659 (2010). Then-Professor Posner made the observation already in the late
1970s. See Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV.
925, 925 (1979) (“[T]he distinctions between these schools have greatly diminished.”).
24 Daniel A. Crane, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Neo-Chicago, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1911
(2009).
25 JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION (1956); see also BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANI-
ZATION, supra note 21, at 210–66. Bain was a Harvard-trained economist and strongly associated
with the Harvard School of the 1950s and 1960s; however, he spent virtually his entire academic
career at the University of California at Berkeley. See Herbert Hovenkamp, United States Com-
petition Policy in Crisis, supra note 17, at 348; Herbert Hovenkamp, Introduction to the Neal
Report and the Crisis in Antitrust, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, Spring 2009, at 217, 219–22
[hereinafter Neal Report Introduction].
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Bain defined the conditions of entry as determining the robustness of potential
competition, measured by “the advantages of established sellers in an industry
over potential entrant sellers, these advantages being reflected in the extent to
which established sellers can persistently raise their prices above a competi-
tive level without attracting new firms to enter the industry.”26 This approach
enabled Bain to give quantitative measures of entry barriers on a scale ranging
from zero, in a situation where any incumbent price above cost would induce
entry, to some very high number. It also enabled Bain to distinguish factors
such as barriers “realized ex post or anticipated ex ante” and to speak of the
minimum scale needed for entry, the sufficiency of entry to bring prices back
to the competitive level, and to rank outsider firms by their ability to attain
entry.27 Bain did something that Neo-Chicago scholars heartily embrace,
which is a great deal of empirical testing of his assumptions.28 Notwithstand-
ing the many critiques of Bain’s conception of entry barriers, it remains
highly influential and is largely incorporated in the 2010 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines issued by the antitrust enforcement agencies, as well as the prede-
cessor 1992 Guidelines.29
The Chicago School’s principal criticism of Bain’s conception of entry bar-
riers was that it included all factors that permitted incumbents to earn
supracompetitive returns without encouraging entry. As a result, it did not
exclude barriers that were the product of efficiency. Most significantly, under
Bain’s definition, an economy of scale is a barrier to entry. If minimum effi-
cient scale in an industry is, say, 30 percent of the market (at a competitive
price) and the market is already occupied by three efficient firms, there is no
room for a fourth. Bain counted such a market as having high entry barriers
even though the entry barrier was efficiency itself.30
In his very influential monograph on industrial organization George Stigler
gave this alternative definition, which is often identified with the Chicago
School: A barrier to entry is “a cost of producing (at some or every rate of
output) which must be borne by a firm which seeks to enter an industry but is
26 BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION, supra note 25, at 3.
27 Id. at 10.
28 E.g., Joe S. Bain, Relation of Profit Rate to Industry Concentration: American Manufactur-
ing, 1936–1940, 65 Q.J. ECON. 293 (1951); Joe S. Bain, Workable Competition in Oligopoly:
Theoretical Considerations and Some Empirical Evidence, 40 AM. ECON. REV. 35, 37–38
(1950), Joe S. Bain, The Profit Rate as a Measure of Monopoly Power, 55 Q.J. ECON. 271
(1941); see also Dave Rosenberg, Note, Allocating the Burden of Persuasion for Entry Issues in
the Government’s Horizontal Merger Cases, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1937 (2010).
29 U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 10 (2010)
[hereinafter 2010 Merger Guidelines], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/
hmg-2010.html.
30 See, e.g., BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION, supra note 25, at 93–110.
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not borne by firms already in the industry.”31 Stigler’s definition excluded
economies of scale because attainment of scale economies was not a cost
unique to new entrants; everyone had to attain them. Ever since, the Stigler
definition has been presented in the Chicago School antitrust writing, and
even a small amount of case law, as superior to the Bain definition for anti-
trust purposes.32
It is not superior, however, because it does not address the questions that
antitrust policy asks.33 When Stigler wrote his chapter on entry barriers in the
late 1960s,34 Congress, many academics, and some of the case law were con-
templating purely structural, or “no fault,” approaches to monopolization. The
Neal Report had been commissioned by President Johnson in 1967 and was
published in 1969.35 That Report took a heavily structuralist approach to anti-
trust and even recommended a “concentrated industries act,” which would
have broken up firms in markets thought to be overly concentrated. In 1978
Areeda and Turner, who were much less interventionist than the Neal Report
on most issues,36 published the first three volumes of the Antitrust Law trea-
tise, including their previously discussed proposal for a “no fault” monopoli-
zation rule permitting government-initiated breakups without proof of
anticompetitive conduct.37
Against this background, which was heavily influenced by the S-C-P para-
digm, Stigler’s critique was valuable and powerful. Breaking up firms that
had done nothing improper except to take advantage of scale economies, thus
bringing lower costs to the market, seemed quite wrong. More to the point,
31 GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 67 (1968).
32 E.g., Ball Mem’l Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1335 (9th Cir. 1986)
(applying Stigler test and finding low entry barriers); Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Kan., Inc., 635 F. Supp. 1287, 1329 (D. Kan. 1986) (similar). Cf. United States v. Microsoft
Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 56 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting dispute over definition but declining to choose a
side because entry barriers were sufficiently high under either definition); L.A. Land Co. v.
Brunswick Corp., 6 F.3d 1422, 1428 (9th Cir. 1993) (defining entry barrier as “the disadvantage
of new entrants as compared to incumbents”).
33 See 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 420 (3d ed. 2007); Richard Schmalensee,
Sunk Costs and Antitrust Barriers to Entry, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 471 (May 2004) (preferring
Bainian definition).
34 Id. Nearly all of Stigler’s book had been previously published as articles in various econom-
ics journals. However, his Chapter 6, entitled “Barriers to Entry, Economies of Scale, and Firm
Size,” appeared in this volume for the first time. See also Harold Demsetz, Industry Structure,
Market Rivalry, and Public Policy, 16 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1973); Harold Demsetz, Barriers to
Entry, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 47 (1982).
35 See REPORT OF THE WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON ANTITRUST POLICY, reprinted at 115
CONG. REC. 13,890, 13,897 (May 27, 1969); see also Stephen Calkins, Antitrust Modernization:
Looking Backwards, 31 J. CORP. L. 421 (2006); Hovenkamp, Neal Report Introduction, supra
note 25.
36 Herbert Hovenkamp, Harvard, Chicago, and Transaction Cost Economics in Antitrust
Analysis, 55 ANTITRUST BULL. 613 (2010).
37 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 1, ¶¶ 618–623.
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breaking up firms whose size results from scale economies will produce more
firms in a market but they will have higher costs. There was no basis for
thinking that courts would do a better job of determining optimal firm size
than markets did.
But the rejection of structuralism in the 1970s and after largely took the
wind out of Stigler’s sails. Today the monopolization offense requires anti-
competitive conduct as well as market dominance, and the courts have taken
some care that anticompetitive conduct not be defined too broadly.38 In a mo-
nopolization case today what we want to know is the answer to the question
that Bain asked: whether a firm in this market can profitably maintain prices
above cost without encouraging entry.39 For example, if a dominant firm files
a fraudulent patent infringement suit intended to keep a threatening technol-
ogy out of the market40 it should not be an answer that the dominant firm’s
market position results from scale economies, so the market does not contain
high entry barriers and a Section 2 claim is inappropriate. We are not punish-
ing the firm for attaining economies of scale in the existing technology, a
backward-looking question, but rather for the anticompetitive, forward look-
ing act of excluding a new technology. Of course, we may not want to break
up the firm as a penalty for its conduct, but that is a different question.
Underlying this debate are some fairly strong assumptions about the cost of
movement. For the structuralists, resources had been deployed in ways that
would prevent them from being redeployed without government intervention.
For Stigler, the market would correct monopoly unless one of two things were
true. First, scale economies may be a consequence of technological and engi-
neering factors that make them more or less inevitable. In that case the gov-
ernment cannot improve economic performance by structural relief. Second,
entry barriers might result from state-imposed licensing requirements or other
market deficiencies that do permit incumbent firms to keep rivals out, but in
such cases the best corrective is removal of the defect.
In contrast, antitrust use of a Bainian conception of entry barriers today,
coupled with a requirement of anticompetitive conduct, captures something
38 E.g., Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009) (rejecting price
squeeze claims where there was no duty to deal and no showing of prices below cost); Weyer-
haeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc., 549 U.S. 312 (2007) (similar, preda-
tory purchasing); Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 408–09 (2004) (no liability for unilateral refusal to deal); Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993) (predatory pricing requires both prices below
cost and structure indicating likelihood of recoupment).
39 For example, this is the question posed by the “recoupment” requirement in Brooke Group.
40 See, e.g., Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49
(1993) (limiting Walker Process-style suits to objectively unreasonable infringement actions);
Walker Process Equip. Inc. v. Food Mach. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965) (approving antitrust coun-
terclaims based on assertion of patent allegedly obtained by fraud).
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that neither the structuralists themselves nor the Chicago School accounted for
satisfactorily—namely, that dominant firms could manipulate technology
choices or market patterns in ways that would prevent or delay their market’s
movement to a more competitive equilibrium.
IV. ANTITRUST’S WELFARE TESTS
Antitrust is often touted as a “consumer welfare” prescription, and many
argue that antitrust should adopt a “consumer welfare” test rather than a “gen-
eral welfare” or “economic welfare” test for anticompetitive practices.41 Of
course, these two policies need not exhaust the field, but they have certainly
accounted for most of the debate over antitrust’s test for welfare. The Chicago
School, the Harvard School, Post-Chicago, and Neo-Chicago all agree that
antitrust must pursue some conception of competition that is driven by con-
cerns for economic welfare.
The same thing was true, however, of structuralism within economics. Mid-
20th century economists, such as Edward S. Mason and Joe S. Bain, generally
believed that competition relates to productivity, output, and marginal cost
pricing. Kaysen and Turner, whose 1959 book on Antitrust Policy was written
prior to Turner’s “conversion” from structuralism,42 rejected any notion that
antitrust should be concerned with “fair conduct” aside from welfare. Indeed,
for them structuralism was a mechanism for getting away from the need to
evaluate business conduct because such evaluations seemed to be inherently
subjective and uncertain.43 Kaysen and Turner could not find any criterion of
“fairness” in conduct that would enable them to distinguish competitive from
noncompetitive situations. They condemned as “superficial” any attempt to
use antitrust laws to “[f]orbid[ ] the use of unfair tactics as a means of acquir-
ing monopoly power.”44 They were equally hostile toward any view that anti-
trust should limit big business for its own sake. They conceded that such ideas
“often in inchoate form, undoubtedly provide an important emotional substra-
tum on which political support for antitrust policy of some kind rests,”45 and
that Congress and the courts of their day were heavily focused on issues of
41 E.g., Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust:
The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 74–77 (1982); Steven C. Salop,
Question: What Is the Real and Proper Antitrust Welfare Standard? Answer: The True Con-
sumer Welfare Standard, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 336 (2010).
42 On Turner’s “conversion,” see HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE, supra note 23, at
37–38; Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rationalization of Antitrust, 116 HARV. L. REV. 917 (2003)
(book review).
43 CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL
ANALYSIS 15–17 (1959).
44 Id. at 16.
45 Id. at 18.
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fairness and size.46 Nevertheless, they advocated for an antitrust policy fo-
cused on limiting the exercise of monopoly power, economically defined.47 So
even for the structuralists the debate was not about whether antitrust should
adopt some version of economic welfare as its goal, but rather about the way
that antitrust’s welfare concerns should be measured.
One hesitates to delve too deeply into this problem because its practical
consequences are limited. Further, antitrust does not use welfare tests of any
kind very consistently. Nevertheless, one’s position on the appropriate welfare
standard for antitrust rests on some premises about how resources move
through the economy. If resources moved freely, we would not need to worry
because monopoly would be bought off by customers or dissipated by new
competition. Where the movement of resources is costly, the tests make a
difference.
A general welfare test could adopt potential Pareto, or Kaldor-Hicks, effi-
ciency as a goal: a shift in resources is a gain if the sum of all gains exceeds
the sum of all losses. That is, the gainers would be able to compensate the
losers fully out of their gains without being worse of themselves. The move-
ment of a market from monopoly to competition represents a potential Pareto
improvement assuming that no one else is affected. The lower price on current
output benefits consumers and injures producers by the same amount, so it is a
wash. The elimination of monopoly deadweight loss benefits consumers,
however, while also giving some benefit to producers. When such a market
becomes competitive the producer is worse off, but consumers are better off
by a greater amount.
By contrast, a “consumer welfare” prescription looks at consumer gains or
losses and pays no attention to producer gains or losses. The movement from
monopoly to competition in the previous illustration certainly passes this test
as well as the general welfare test. The two tests produce different outcomes
in situations where consumers lose but producers gain, and by a larger
amount. In that case the movement of resources is Pareto superior and gainers
could compensate the losers out of their gains. The practice would be permit-
ted under a general welfare test but condemned under a consumer welfare test.
The best known example is the merger in a concentrated market that simulta-
neously increases consumer prices but also produces efficiencies. If the effi-
ciency gains from the merger exceed consumer losses, the merger is efficient
by the potential Pareto criterion even though the only thing consumers see is a
price increase. Oliver Williamson famously showed with a simple model that
a merger with fairly modest efficiency gains could create net social wealth
46 Id. at 16–20.
47 Id. at 21–22.
82 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 78
even though prices went up.48 The consumer welfare prescription would con-
demn the merger because it causes consumer losses even though the producer
gains are larger. Indeed, theoretically, such a merger might result in consumer
prices that are $1.00 higher in the aggregate but production efficiency gains of
$1 million. Under the consumer welfare test, the merger would be condemned
because we would look only at the $1.00 price increase and ignore the produc-
tion efficiencies gains that are many times larger.
General welfare and consumer welfare tests rest on differing assumptions
about the cost of movement. If one has a high degree of confidence that re-
sources will move toward consumers in the long run, then a general welfare
test works well because it protects all efficiencies, trusting that consumers will
eventually benefit. By contrast, if one is inclined to believe that producer
gains tend to stay with producers, never getting passed on to consumers, then
the solution is to insist on significant consumer gains right out of the box.
One deficiency in these tests is that they ignore the welfare of parties other
than the antitrust defendant and its customers. As a result, the welfare of com-
petitors is not taken into account at all. This approach might make some sense
when we are thinking of monopoly in public utility terms, where its social
cost results from the output reduction and we can debate how to treat the
wealth transfer from consumers to the producer. But the business of antitrust
is not concerned principally with franchise monopolies. It is heavily con-
cerned with exclusionary practices, and these can be very costly, particularly
if resources other than those of the dominant firm or cartel are wasted.49 Lost
investment is socially costly because specialized resources cannot costlessly
be redeployed. This is an absolute cost of resource movement, not principally
a transaction cost.
Suppose a dominant firm has Alpha technology and is enjoying monopoly
prices. A newcomer develops Beta technology at a fixed development cost of
$100 million. The technology is never deployed, however, because the domi-
nant firm fraudulently obtains a patent whose claims cover a significant por-
tion of the Beta technology. The new firm exits, and its technology is never
introduced. The relevant losses from this story include several components.
First is the difference between the monopoly prices that consumers pay for the
Alpha product and the competitive price they would have paid had Beta been
introduced. This is largely a wealth transfer because the consumer losses are
offset by Alpha’s additional profits. Second are the unmade sales that would
have been generated had Beta been introduced and output brought up to the
48 Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM.
ECON. REV. 18, 22–23 (1968).
49 On the “external” welfare losses of monopoly created by exclusionary practices, see
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 22, §1.3; see also Salop, supra note 41.
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competitive level. These are consumer losses that are not offset by producer
gains; they most closely represent the classic deadweight loss of monopoly.
Third are any unrealized gains that might result from the fact that Beta was a
superior technology; so the unrealized gains may not have been limited to
more units of the same thing, but also the incremental consumer value that
might have accrued from something better.50 Fourth, and finally, is the $100
million investment, a fixed cost item which, if specialized, is sunk and simply
lost.
In The Antitrust Paradox Judge Bork famously used the term “consumer
welfare” to mean a variation on total welfare that included the sum of supplier
and consumer surplus but ignored the welfare of excluded rivals or other third
parties.51 In defending the definition he observed (1) antitrust should take no
position on how wealth is distributed but only on the efficient allocation of
resources; (2) looking at the market as a whole everyone is a consumer; and
(3) in the longer run producer gains tend to be competed away into consumer
gains.
The first point might well be correct, but rivals’ loss of unrecoverable in-
vestment is not a wealth transfer; a significant portion of it is deadweight loss.
Bork assumed zero costs of movement, thus excluding the cost of unrecover-
able losses imposed on rivals. On the second point, everyone does show up in
the market as a consumer, but that point is largely irrelevant to policymaking.
Yes, everyone is a speeder, but that does not justify the police in handing out
speeding tickets at random rather than detecting speeders on an individual
basis. The third point may or may not be true depending on one’s assumptions
about how freely resources move.
When our concerns are purely collusive or vertical, involving high con-
sumer prices but not exclusion of rivals, then the main question is whether
producer gains must be “passed on” to consumers. This is another way of
saying that we want a potential Pareto improvement to become a real Pareto
improvement by actually requiring that the gainers (producers) compensate
the losers (consumers) out of their gains.
Consider the statement on efficiencies in the 2010 Merger Guidelines,
which is similar to the one contained in the predecessor Guidelines published
in 1992:
The Agencies will not challenge a merger if cognizable efficiencies are of
a character and magnitude such that the merger is not likely to be anticom-
50 See CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT:
PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION, ch.11 (2012).
51 ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 106–15
(1978).
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petitive in any relevant market. To make the requisite determination, the
Agencies consider whether cognizable efficiencies likely would be sufficient
to reverse the merger’s potential to harm customers in the relevant market,
e.g., by preventing price increases in that market.52
The Guidelines also include this footnote to the above passage:
The Agencies normally give the most weight to the results of this analysis
over the short term. The Agencies also may consider the effects of cogniza-
ble efficiencies with no short-term, direct effect on prices in the relevant
market. Delayed benefits from efficiencies (due to delay in the achievement
of, or the realization of customer benefits from, the efficiencies) will be
given less weight because they are less proximate and more difficult to pre-
dict. Efficiencies relating to costs that are fixed in the short term are unlikely
to benefit customers in the short term, but can benefit customers in the
longer run, e.g., if they make new product introduction less expensive.53
In the longer run, if the costs of movement are sufficiently low, the effi-
ciency gains from this merger will be at least partly passed on to consumers.
The Guidelines state that the Agencies will consider some longer run effects,
citing two possibilities: there might be a “delay in the achievement of” an
efficiency, or there might be a delay in the “realization of customer benefits”
from the efficiency. These are in fact two quite different things. First, some
efficiencies cannot immediately be implemented. For example, while a
merger may enable a firm to take advantage of another firm’s superior tech-
nology, implementing that change could require re-outfitting of plants or pro-
duction processes and could take several months or even years. In other cases
the delay in consumer benefit may occur because, although the cost reduction
takes effect immediately, the market will not immediately reflect these costs
savings via lower prices.
However, the Guidelines appear not to make any allowance for a merger to
be approved because of productive efficiency gains that will not in the fore-
seeable future be sufficient to offset a price increase. At first glance that might
suggest that the Guidelines are adopting a consumer welfare rather than a
general welfare test for merger efficiencies, although clearly there is more
going on here. Most importantly, the Agencies are rightfully cynical about
efficiency claims, which are frequently made but rarely proven, particularly in
light of the fact that cognizable efficiencies must be merger-specific. Second,
as predictions of promised merger specific gains extend over longer runs, the
level of speculation becomes unacceptably high.54 In contrast, the tools that
52 2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 29, § 10.
53 Id. n.15.
54 In part, the longer the relevant time period the greater the likelihood that the gains would
have been realized without any need for the merger.
2012] ANTITRUST AND THE COSTS OF MOVEMENT 85
the Agencies use to predict price increases largely look toward price changes
that are likely to occur in a relatively short time horizon.
Fundamentally, Bork’s preference for a conception of efficiency that aggre-
gates seller and consumer gains rests most strongly on an assumption about
the costs and likelihood of resource mobility. With complete resource mobil-
ity all gains will accrue to consumers as some combination of new entry, rival
expansion, and consumer choice forces prices closer to costs. In some cases
the “run” may be very long, and in others there may be impediments that
make monopoly relatively durable. Those favoring a consumer welfare ap-
proach assume that the costs of moving resources is sufficiently high that the
burden of showing resource movement to competition rests on the defendant.
The 2010 Merger Guidelines want to see some evidence that cost savings will
really be passed on in a particular case. In sum, arguments favoring a general
welfare or consumer welfare test for antitrust largely rest on differing assump-
tions about the costs and thus the likelihood of resource movement from pro-
ducers to consumers.
V. ANTITRUST PRACTICES AND THE COST OF MOVEMENT
This section considers a few specific practices in which the absolute cost of
resource movement plays a role in antitrust analysis.
A. NETWORKS AND REFUSAL TO DEAL
Networks are wonderful things. They enable markets to attain significant
economies of scale and scope in both supply and consumption. If properly
organized, they can also provide a platform for competitive behavior “on” the
network. For example, today’s telecommunications network gives us the scale
and scope advantages of virtually universal interconnectivity,55 plus a set of
technological standards and operating protocols that enable thousands of firms
to hook in and sell their services or products in competitive markets.
Dominant firms in networks generally profit when smaller firms develop
complementary products and services, but not when they develop substitutes.
This principle very largely accounts for Microsoft’s behavior with respect to
its market-dominating Windows computer operating system. The attachment
of attractive complements tends to make the dominant firm’s own technology
more valuable, while substitutes tend to threaten it. The EU’s “server” case
55 Thanks to the 1996 Telecommunications Act, 47 U.S.C. §251(c)(3), and prior to that, an
antitrust consent decree. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 136 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d
mem. sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). On the interaction between
regulation and antitrust refusal to deal law, see 3B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 787c
(3d ed. 2008).
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against Microsoft illustrates this.56 For some time the market for server sys-
tems (for clients, such as email and Internet access) was dominated by firms
other than Microsoft, which had not entered that market. These firms largely
provided hardware and an operating system to their own customers and relied
on Microsoft’s provision of interconnection protocols to link the servers into
the Windows-dominated system. In that regime the existence of a comple-
mentary server market enhanced the value of the network and thus of
Microsoft Windows. For example, the owner of a railroad could be expected
to cooperate with someone who wanted to offer hotel services located along
the tracks so long as it was not doing so itself. The hotels would make the
railroad as a whole more attractive. However, as soon as the railroad began to
set up and operate its own hotels its position would change. Now it can supply
these benefits on its own and the third party becomes a competitor rather than
a complement. Once Microsoft entered the server market its incentives
changed in the same way.
Depending on the situation, networks can greatly decrease or greatly in-
crease the cost of moving resources. For example, a competitive network with
fairly open entry rules, such as the telephone system, makes it possible for
firms to supply communications services without duplicating the entire net-
work. This makes it much easier for a single small firm to enter the business.
On the other side, technologically laden networks tend to generate significant
path dependence, and the costs of migrating out of path dependent technolo-
gies rises dramatically as more firms and resources are invested in the existing
technology. More specifically, networks can reduce the costs of innovating
inside the network but increase the costs of innovating in competition with the
network. The relevant costs are hardly limited to transactions but include the
costs of producing and deploying alternative technologies, as well as lost in-
vestment in existing technologies. For example, the existence of the telephone
network dramatically increases the costs of developing a new telephone that is
technologically superior but incompatible with the existing network.
An important part of our antitrust agenda for the future must be the devel-
opment of reasonable refusal to deal rules for dominated networks—that is,
networks that (1) dominate the market in which they operate and (2) are them-
selves dominated by a dominant firm. Networks can greatly increase the costs
of moving resources because so much has to be carried along. While the Su-
preme Court’s Trinko decision imposed severe limitations on the antitrust law
of unilateral refusal to deal, it did so in a regime in which an alternative regu-
latory authority had the power to compel precisely the dealing obligation that
56 Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, ¶¶ 1–28, available at
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=62940&doclang=en&mode=&part=1.
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the plaintiffs were requesting under antitrust law.57 In the absence of those
dealing obligations the telephone system would very likely revert to single-
firm dominance, but without price regulation. To be sure, competing technol-
ogies might emerge. In the telecommunications network they already have,
aided by the broad sharing obligations of the Telecommunications Act. The
best solution for global market dominating networks such as the telecom sys-
tem is to let the network itself attain the size and shape that will achieve all
available economies of scale and scope, but then to use legal policy to pre-
serve competition within the network.58 To the extent regulatory policy does
not already do this, antitrust appropriately has a role.59
Unilateral refusals to deal by monopolists raise a number of thorny issues
about administrability and incentives. It is difficult to compel dealing without
regulating the price, and aggressive dealing rules reduce the incentives of
small firms to make their own investments in innovation or productive as-
sets.60 These issues do not go away in the case of dominated networks, but the
stakes change because in networks the costs of movement are much higher
than in markets where unlinked firms are free to pursue distinct technologies.
Whether it deals with rivals or not, the dominant firm in a dominant network
necessarily controls the technology choices of rivals, which can survive only
by maintaining compatibility, and their survival is essential to network
competitiveness.
B. VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND PRODUCT COMPLEMENTARITY
1. Asset Specificity
In the thirty-five years since Oliver E. Williamson published Markets and
Hierarchies, transaction cost economics has transformed our understanding of
vertical integration and other durable economic relationships.61 For the struc-
turalists, vertical integration was a suspicious practice occasionally justified
by economies of scale but often used to leverage additional profits or else to
entrench dominance by creating barriers to entry or fringe expansion.62 For the
57 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408–09
(2004); see 3B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶¶ 772d, 773–74 (3d ed. 2008).
58 See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 772h (Supp. 2010); Herbert Hovenkamp, The
Obama Administration and Section Two of the Sherman Act, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1611 (2010).
59 See BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 50, ch. 11.
60 See 3B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶¶ 770–772 (3d ed. 2008).
61 OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICA-
TIONS (1975); see Hovenkamp, Harvard, Chicago, and Transaction Cost Economics in Antitrust
Analysis, supra note 36.
62 E.g., BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION, supra note 25, at 142–43, 212; ARTHUR ROB-
ERT BURNS, THE DECLINE OF COMPETITION (1936); CORWIN D. EDWARDS, MAINTAINING COMPE-
TITION 130 (1949); DAVID LYNCH, THE CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC POWER 132 (1946);
HENRY C. SIMONS, A POSITIVE PROGRAM FOR LAISSEZ-FAIRE 20–21 (1934). For a survey discus-
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classic Chicago School, vertical integration was simply not a monopoly prob-
lem at all because it did not increase a firm’s share in any market except
insofar as integration efficiencies enabled firms to increase output at rivals’
expense. That view rejected both the leverage theory and the foreclosure the-
ory of competitive harm.63
Transaction cost economics and its recognition of the importance of asset
specificity persuasively showed why the structuralists’ suspicion of vertical
agreements is in most cases not justified; but it also provided a valuable cri-
tique of some of the assumptions underlying the Chicago School’s attitude
towards vertical restraints.
Coase’s prescient observations about the costs of using the market in The
Nature of the Firm (1937) inspired a generation of economists forty years
later to rewrite the theory of vertical contracting and control.64 They did this
first by building on Coase’s insight that the boundaries of a firm are deter-
mined by the comparative costs and benefits of internal production as against
external procurement. Second, they observed that market alternatives to full
ownership integration required markets to emulate certain features of firm
production, the most important of which is asset specificity. This meant that
most of the long-term, exclusive contracts that structuralist antitrust had found
so suspicious were actually efficient coordination mechanisms.
Asset specificity creates costs of movement quite aside from transaction
costs. For example, once Fisher Body Works has built its plant with a special-
ized technology and in a certain location, General Motors is its best customer
and Fisher in turn is GM’s best supplier of automobile bodies.65 The cost of
extraction from this situation is not so much a problem in transacting costs,
but rather in the real costs of moving resources from point A to point B. Like
Sturges and Bridgeman, the physician and confectioner in the nuisance case
that Coase made famous, they are forced to bargain with each other as long as
the (transaction) costs of reaching a satisfactory bargain are lower than the
(nontransaction) costs of moving away.66
sion, see Hovenkamp, The Law of Vertical Integration and the Business Firm: 1880–1960, supra
note 21, 900–09.
63 E.g., Robert Bork, Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act: The Legal History of an Eco-
nomic Misconception, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 157, 159 (1954).
64 Coase, The Nature of the Firm, supra note 16; see WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERAR-
CHIES, supra note 61; Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Inte-
gration, Appropriate Rents and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297
(1978).
65 See, e.g., Ronald H. Coase, The Acquisition of Fisher Body by General Motors, 43 J.L. &
ECON. 15 (2000); see also Benjamin Klein, Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership:
The Fisher Body-General Motors Relationship Revisited, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 199 (1988).
66 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Coasean Markets, 31 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 63 (2011).
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To say this somewhat differently, under product or process differentiation,
contractual vertical integration and the investment it induces create tiny “mar-
kets” with boundaries similar to those of the Coasean business firm—namely,
along the line of equipoise between the marginal (transaction) costs of reach-
ing a bargain inside and the marginal (significantly nontransaction) costs of
abandoning previous commitments and moving outside. While very small,
these markets are also characterized by some of the features that neoclassical
economics has found to be highly problematic, such as extreme product dif-
ferentiation, bilateral monopoly, and the possibility of double marginalization
vis-à-vis outsiders. Bargaining in such a setting can become complex and
even ugly. Witness the large number of federal and state provisions that regu-
late franchise relationships, including car dealers and gasoline stations.67
Making antitrust policy in such settings requires an awareness of these
complications, the value that they have the potential to create, and possible
risks. The possibilities for benefit are many while those for harm are few but
cannot entirely be ignored. The structuralists were misled because they did not
understand the role of specific interfirm commitments and the complications
they can produce. As a result, they did not appreciate the role of complex
contracting in markets for vertical or shared control. The thing that leads to
high costs of movement, including transaction costs, is asset specificity,
which is common in complex contractual hierarchies. This is in turn quite
typically a function of product differentiation, something that also made struc-
turalists suspicious. If automobile bodies were fungible across automobile
producers, then GM and Fisher would not have had to “dedicate” their pro-
duction to one another.
Most holdup problems are not a function of transaction costs as such, but
rather of the absolute cost of moving resources when compared to the costs of
transacting. Beginning with a model of distribution based largely on commod-
ities and also a strong distrust of product differentiation, the structuralists
tended to see complex vertical contracting devices (tying, exclusive agree-
ments, and resale price and nonprice agreements) as problems of monopoly.
Antitrust and patent policy have been preoccupied with tying arrangements
and similar exclusionary contracts ever since the beginning of the 20th cen-
tury.68 Notwithstanding the Chicago School’s withering critique of the “lever-
67 See, e.g., ABA, FRANCHISE DESK BOOK: SELECTED STATES LAWS, COMMENTARY AND AN-
NOTATIONS (W. Michael Garner ed., 2d ed. 2008 & Supp.); FRANCHISING LAW (Martin Mendel-
sohn ed., 2d ed. 2004).
68 E.g., Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 31 (1912) (rejecting first-sale doctrine attack on
patent tie; finding no reason to condemn it under the Sherman Act); Motion Picture Patents Co.
v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 518–19 (1917) (applying patent misuse doctrine and
Clayton Act to condemn patent tie; overruling Henry); see Christina Bohannan, IP Misuse as
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age” theory of tying arrangements, which began in the 1950s,69 tying defined
broadly remains a very important focus of antitrust concern. However, fore-
closure and not leverage accounts for most of it.70 The reason is not difficult to
understand: ties can increase the cost of movement by preventing a switch in
one of the products unless the buyer also switches the other product. For ex-
ample, in order to compete with Kodak’s Instamatic package of streamlined
camera and cartridge film, its rival Berkey Photo had to either re-engineer
both the camera and the film or else find some alternative avenue of access.71
The Chicago critique discredited the orthodox leverage theory and at-
tempted to discredit the foreclosure theory of ties by equating foreclosure with
efficiency.72 But that theory was itself based on an orthodox model of a com-
modity monopolist whose output was readily moveable from one intermediary
to another. Within that model vertical integration forced a realignment of
purchasing patterns but did little else. For example, if a gasoline refiner ac-
quired a chain of gasoline stations and engaged in exclusive supply, remaining
refiners and stations would simply realign their sale and purchasing patterns.
Bork used precisely this illustration to indicate why vertical control leads to a
realignment of purchasing and sales patterns but not to competitive harm. His
premise was that suppliers and purchasers could costlessly realign their
deals.73
This critique was in turn critiqued not by any “Post-Chicago” or “Neo-
Chicago” economics, but by simple transaction cost analysis that showed both
the efficiency possibilities and the occasional competitive risks of vertical
contracting in markets subject to greater amounts of asset specificity. The
defining characteristic of such markets is that the absolute cost of moving
resources was higher because assets could not costly be shifted from one firm
to another without substantial modification.
In any event, the necessary condition for harm is “external” market power,
which means market power in the larger market for final distribution74 rather
than any opportunism that might exist between the parties themselves. This
Foreclosure, 96 IOWA L. REV. 475 (2011); Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Sale Restraints and Com-
petitive Harm: the First Sale Doctrine in Perspective, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 487 (2011).
69 See Ward Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19
(1957); see also Posner, supra note 23 (identifying attack on leverage theory as defining charac-
teristic of Chicago School critique).
70 See Erik Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Harm, 52
ARIZ. L. REV. 925 (2010) [hereinafter Tying Arrangements].
71 Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979).
72 E.g., BORK, supra note 51, at 225–56 (1978) (discussing vertical integration); id. at 365–81
(discussing tying).
73 See id. at 232–33.
74 Or, in the case of monopsony, input procurement. See ROGER D. BLAIR & JEFFREY L.
HARRISON, MONOPSONY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 41–67 (rev. ed. 2010).
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explains the error in the Supreme Court’s 1992 Kodak decision and why it
cannot be defended on any grounds, including Post-Chicago.75 The Supreme
Court confused the market complexities that result from a specialized contrac-
tual distribution system, in this case for long-run provision of photocopying
through the sale and subsequent maintenance of copy machines, with real
market power. It turned the everyday problem of asset specificity into an ex-
traordinary problem of monopoly. Under modern distribution systems with
dedicated assets, virtually all firms are “locked in” to some degree. The op-
portunism that results is not an antitrust problem unless it leads to a market-
wide output reduction.
Similar factors apply to “commons,” or horizontal collaboration in develop-
ment or production.76 The distinctive feature of a commons, which can include
everything from fisheries to water rights to patent pools and standard-setting
organizations, is that the costs of identifying and thus of enforcing individual
boundaries is high, a fact that is often based on the fugitive nature of the thing
for which a property right is claimed. A firm invests in the defense of individ-
ual boundaries up to the point that the net payoff from individual ownership
equals that of joint ownership. The line between individual and shared owner-
ship lies where the two are in equipoise. Because different assets have differ-
ent boundary characteristics, it is not uncommon that firms have pooled rights
over some resources but individual rights over others. For example, farmers
may graze their cattle on a commons but grow their corn on individual plats of
ground, or firms may pool the patents but produce and distribute goods in
separate facilities and through separate channels.77 Once again, the line be-
tween commons and exclusive ownership depends much more on the physical
nature of the asset and the mechanisms available for controlling it, than on
transaction costs. For example, while it is correct to say that high transaction
costs in bargaining for individual rights explain patent pools, the transaction
costs are high because patent boundaries are so difficult to identify.78
2. Double Marginalization
Bilateral monopoly79 is ubiquitous in modern distribution systems for the
reasons outlined above. Specialized investment locks firms together when the
75 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451 (1992); see Herbert
Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and Critique, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 257
(2001) (advocating overruling Kodak).
76 E.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990).
77 See BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 50, ch. 12.
78 Id.
79 Perhaps a better term would be “bilateral oligopoly,” because the number of firms bound
together often exceeds one on each side but is limited to a small number. For example, hospital
Group Purchasing Organizations sometimes have “dual source” contracts, which means that the
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net costs of reaching a bargain are less than the cost of abandoning those
investments and moving on. The latter set of costs are not limited to transac-
tion costs but also include the engineering or transportation costs of aban-
doning one set of technologies or physical positions in favor of another. The
bargaining may involve one firm’s taking advantage of another, and it may
involve contracts with terms that antitrust law has historically regarded as
suspicious, such as exclusivity provisions, tying, or price maintenance. But
these are nothing more than the antitrust equivalent of family squabbles that
naturally arise when people are in a relationship from which extraction is not
cost free.
Double marginalization arises when two firms make complementary or ver-
tically related products that are thus typically used together and each firm has
some market power in its own product. If each maximizes individually, the
aggregate price will be “too high,” in the very strong sense that the buyer of
the two products and the sellers of each of them would all be better off if they
could coordinate output to the joint-maximizing level. Consumers are also
injured to the extent that the buyer must pass on the higher prices it pays.
Thus, antitrust’s concern with welfare loss or consumer injury properly kicks
in. When it occurs, double marginalization is harmful under both a general
welfare and a consumer welfare theory.
While double marginalization is a problem in vertical integration of succes-
sive firms with market power, it applies equally well to complements.80 In-
deed, the problem is more serious with respect to complements because the
makers of complementary products are often not in a good position to bargain
with each other, while vertically related firms bargain all the time. Thus, for
example, so-called “royalty stacking” of IP rights can lead to double
marginalization problems, depending on the extent of substitutes for each in-
dividual right. If a widget maker requires licenses to both utility and process
patents Alpha and Beta, neither of which has good substitutes, Alpha will set
a royalty taking existing supply by others as given and Beta will do the same
thing. The result will be a double markup under which both Alpha and Beta
end up charging more than their profit-maximizing prices.81
One solution to double marginalization problems is for Alpha and Beta to
coordinate their output. Two-part tariffs and pricing schemes can do this by
hospitals can purchase through the contract from two alternative suppliers. See, e.g., Southeast
Mo. Hosp. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 642 F.3d 608 (8th Cir. 2011) (describing dual source contracts).
80 For a graphic illustration, see BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 50, ch. 2. For a more
technical illustration, see Erik Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, The Law and Antitrust Eco-
nomics of Tying (2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1999063.
81 See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV.
1991 (2007).
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reducing or eliminating per-unit markups. For example, a manufacturer with
market power facing dealers with market power might charge a fixed
franchise fee to capture its monopoly return but then sell the product to the
dealers at the competitive price per unit rather than the monopoly price. The
dealers will then optimize by setting a lower retail price. Indeed, their incen-
tive to increase output will be increased to the extent that the franchise fee
operates as a fixed cost that must be distributed across all sales. Maximum
resale price maintenance can do the same thing by forcing a dealer or other
intermediary to assess no more than the competitive markup.82
Another way to combat double marginalization is for one of the firms “uni-
laterally” to offer both of the products (or services) that are subject to double
marginalization when they are offered separately. Tying can do this by ena-
bling a single firm to offer Alpha and Beta in a way that maximizes joint
returns and benefits downstream purchasers, including consumers.83 While the
historical tying arrangement cases in antitrust law often involved commodities
such as dry ice or salt, such ties appear only rarely today outside of the
franchise context. Further, those cases almost never raise serious antitrust con-
cerns because power is lacking. The ties that are of antitrust interest today are
likely to involve two products that both enjoy significant price/cost margins,
such as printers and unique ink cartridges, MP3 players and electronic music,
or computer hardware and software. These situations sort out into at least two
different possibilities. One is that the tie is an exclusionary practice that in-
jures consumers by foreclosing rivals. The other is that it benefits consumers
by addressing double marginalization issues. Aside from this, there may of
course be production or distribution efficiency gains. Some bundles may re-
duce price by significantly reducing double marginalization but also foreclose
rivals.
Much of the literature that finds harm in tying and bundled discounts begins
with assumptions, such as a perfectly competitive secondary market or the
complete absence of fixed costs, that have only occasional application to real-
world situations.84 Others ignore double marginalization issues that may be
crucial when both products are sold in noncompetitive markets.85 While the
82 See Hovenkamp, Harvard, Chicago, and Transaction Cost Economics in Antitrust Analysis,
supra note 36, at 640–41.
83 See Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements, supra note 70 (on tying to solve
double marginalization problems).
84 E.g., Patrick Greenlee, David Reitman & David S. Sibley, An Antitrust Analysis of Bundled
Loyalty Discounts, 26 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 1132 (2008) (assuming secondary products are sold
competitively).
85 Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit
Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 413 (2009) [hereinafter Tying, Bundled Discounts] (discussing
situations where tied market is not competitive but not addressing double marginalization
problems); José Carbajo, David de Meza & Daniel J. Seidmann, A Strategic Motivation for
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theory of double marginalization is robust, its existence, ubiquity, and effects
are subject to testing themselves. It may be less likely as firms choose price
rather than output as a decision variable, assuming that substitutes exist for
the goods in question.86 The problem itself requires prices above cost in each
market, however,87 and the empirical testing generally finds double marginal-
ization effects when two markets are subject to monopoly pricing and later
integrated.88
Ultimately, double marginalization can be avoided if the firms locked into a
bilateral relationship can either (1) negotiate to a joint maximizing output,
which is mainly a transaction problem; or (2) exit from the relationship, which
is mainly a cost of movement problem. Often double marginalization
problems result from costs of movement that antitrust cannot remedy. For
example, royalty stacking may be common in a market because it has an ex-
cess of patents and ordinary research requires too many licenses from too
many sources.89 Or perhaps an overly aggressive policy about patent acquisi-
tion or assignment has prevented patents from being aggregated in such a way
that they could be distributed more efficiently. This problem is not merely one
of transaction costs but also of absolute costs of movement, and one solution
Commodity Bundling, 38 J. INDUS. ECON. 283 (1990) (finding possible negative welfare effects
when monopolist in one good offers fixed proportion bundled against duopolist in second good;
no assumptions about double marginalization). On mixed bundling as a device to eliminate
double marginalization, see Daniel A. Crane, Mixed Bundling, Profit Sacrifice, and Consumer
Welfare, 55 EMORY L.J. 423 (2006); on tying and double marginalization, see Hovenkamp &
Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements, supra note 70.
86 See Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Francesco Parisi, Substituting Complements, 2 J. COMPETI-
TION L. & ECON. 333, 340 (2006); J. Gregory Sidak, Holdup, Royalty Stacking, and the Pre-
sumption of Injunctive Relief for Patent Infringement: A Reply to Lemley and Shapiro, 92 MINN.
L. REV. 714, 746 (2008).
87 Double marginalization of complements can occur under both Cournot and Bertrand com-
petition, depending on the amount of competition each complementary good faces. Of course,
the assumption is that each good is in fact priced above cost. See Dari-Mattiacci & Parisi, supra
note 86; Arthur Lewbel, Bundling of Substitutes or Complements, 3 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 101
(1985); R. Venkatesh & Wagner Kamakura, Optimal Bundling and Pricing Under a Monopoly:
Contrasting Complements and Substitutes from Independently Valued Products, 76 J. BUS. 211
(2003).
88 See Yvonne Durham, An Experimental Examination of Double Marginalization and Verti-
cal Relationships, 42 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 207 (2000); Charles F. Mason & Owen R. Phil-
lips, Vertical Integration and Collusive Incentives: An Experimental Analysis, 18 INT’L J. INDUS.
ORG. 471 (2000); Hans-Theo Normann, Experimental Economics in Antitrust, in 1 ABA, ISSUES
IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 773 (Wayne Dale Collins ed., 2008). By contrast, in markets
where foreclosure is a possibility prices can go down or up, depending on the possibility of
double marginalization. See Stephen Martin, Hans-Theo Normann & Christopher M. Snyder,
Vertical Foreclosure in Experimental Markets, 32 RAND J. ECON. 466, 468 n.10 (2001) (sum-
marizing their own experimental testing and that of others as indicating that vertical integration
under tests such as those of Mason and Phillips, supra, where double marginalization is likely
show increased output, while tests where double marginalization is impossible but foreclosure is
likely show reduced output).
89 See BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 50, ch. 1.
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is to get the rights assigned properly in the first place—in this case by leaving
more of them in the public domain. But that is fundamentally a flaw of a
patent system that is overly generous to patentees, not of the antitrust laws.90
C. PRICING, BUNDLING, AND VERTICAL CONTROL: CREATING ANTITRUST
POLICY FROM NARROW AND UNTESTED MODELS
Pricing practices are antitrust’s proverbial bad penny. They keep returning
and re-returning in various guises to both the legal and the industrial econom-
ics literature. One critique with considerable force is that so much theory
about pricing practices consists of “existence theorems,” or models showing
equilibria that can be derived from given assumptions. Often these models
offer little help in locating situations that satisfy their conditions or, worse yet,
suggest broad application without query into whether the necessary conditions
obtain. Often they make particularly constraining assumptions about the alter-
natives available to rivals. A different but related critique is that the presence
or absence of these conditions may be so difficult to test for that antitrust
decisionmakers cannot reliably determine when they obtain and when they do
not.91
The economics and law of predatory pricing went through a phase much
like this one in the period from the 1950s through the 1970s and beyond—no
shortage of models showing how above cost strategic pricing might be exclu-
sionary and welfare reducing, but no reliable mechanisms for separating out
true instances of such situations. One unfortunate generalization is that mod-
els finding a threat of competitive harm tend to treat rivals as if they were T.S.
Eliot’s “patient etherized upon a table.”92 By contrast, those finding discount-
ing to be competitive and fairly harmless assume that rivals are capable of a
robust range of responses. The effectiveness of predatory pricing depends
heavily on rivals’ and potential rivals’ costs of movement, as well as those
faced by customers. The more readily they can redeploy, the less likely that
strategic pricing will cause competitive harm. A significant feature of prices is
that the absolute cost of moving them, in contrast to the costs of such activi-
ties as plant or product redesign, is very low and typically reversible. This
means that both the predator and its rivals can respond over a wide range of
alternatives.
Nevertheless, existence models serve a useful purpose. First, they show that
certain kinds of anticompetitive equilibria can theoretically exist. Secondly,
they identify the conditions for such equilibria. To that extent they serve to
narrow our search. For example, while the Chicago School may have con-
90 Id. chs. 4–5.
91 See HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE, supra note 23.
92 T.S. Eliot, The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock (1915).
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cluded that a certain quasi-exclusive dealing practice such as a loyalty dis-
count is never anticompetitive, a countering existence theorem might identify
conditions when it could be. At that point a wise antitrust policy would try to
identify situations satisfying those conditions. A corollary is that a particular
theorem cannot be assumed to speak to situations that fail to satisfy its
specifications.
Transaction cost analysis has considerably aided our understanding of why
firms adopt the discount policies that they do, or why they tie or enter exclu-
sive agreements. These are all ways that they can maximize within the envi-
ronment to which their productive assets have been dedicated. But
competitive harm is likely to occur only where the non-transactional costs of
moving resources are high and one or more of the relevant actors has monop-
oly power as a result. That makes market power screens critical to the assess-
ment of all forms of discounting, tying, and exclusive contracting. By
contrast, once we know that market power is lacking, from an enforcement
perspective it is generally unnecessary to continue on with transaction cost
analysis in order to discover the practice’s rationales.
Today there is no shortage of economic models illustrating the exclusionary
power, leveraging, or welfare effects of various price discounting practices.
These models fall generally into two categories. One involves mainly single
product “loyalty” discounts, or discounts that become progressively larger as
the buyer purchases a higher percentage of its needs from the discounting
seller. The other involves “bundled” discounts, which are discounts attached
to an agreement to purchase two or more different things from the seller.
Real-life practices include variations on both, and also instances where the
two are employed together.93
The literature includes many models showing that such discounting prac-
tices can be anticompetitive, but all depend on highly specific assumptions.94
As one group of economists has observed, “The academic literature on loyalty
discounts and exclusive dealing demonstrates that the welfare effects of these
93 E.g., Southeast Mo. Hosp. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 642 F.3d 608 (8th Cir. 2011) (defendant’s
GPO contracts included both bundled and market share discounts); Masimo Corp. v. Tyco Health
Care Grp., L.P., 350 Fed. App’x 95 (9th Cir. 2009) (unpublished decision) (similar).
94 For good surveys up to the time of their publication, see Timothy J. Brennan, Is Competi-
tion the Entry Barrier? Consumer and Total Welfare Benefits of Bundling (AEI/Brookings Joint
Center for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper No. 05-08, 2005), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=834704; David S. Evans & Michael Salinger, Why Do
Firms Bundle and Tie? Evidence from Competitive Markets and Implications for Tying Law, 22
YALE J. ON REG. 37 (2005); Bruce Kobayashi, Does Economics Provide a Reliable Guide to
Regulating Commodity Bundling By Firms? A Survey of the Economic Literature, 1 J. COMPETI-
TION L. & ECON. 707 (2005); see also Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, How Economics
Can Improve Antitrust Doctrine Towards Tie-In Sales, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, Spring 2005,
at 27.
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practices are ambiguous and that market details determine the direction of the
effect.”95 For example, welfare effects differ depending on whether one as-
sumes Bertrand competition (sellers choose price) or Cournot competition
(sellers choose output).96 As to facts, one obtains different welfare results
based on assumptions about whether the secondary market is perfectly com-
petitive or subject to monopoly or oligopoly,97 whether the products in ques-
tion are complements in either production or use, whether the products are
purchased in variable or fixed proportions, whether a bundle contains two
goods or a larger number,98 whether bundling is used against an existing firm
or as an entry deterrence device,99 and, if the latter, whether there is only one
or more than one potential entrant,100 whether the monopolist offers bundling
exclusively or “mixes” bundling and standalone sales,101 whether the buyers
all have identical demand (generally ruling out variable proportions) or di-
verse buyers have differing demands,102 whether costs are constant or subject
to scale economies, whether the tying monopolist increases its price above the
standalone profit-maximizing level at the time it bundles,103 whether the dis-
count requires a pre-commitment such as a most favored nation clause,104
95 Assaf Eilat, Jith Jayaratne, Janusz A. Ordover & Greg Shaffer, How Loyalty Discounts Can
Perversely Discourage Discounting: Comment, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Vol. 4, No. 1, Spring
2010.
96 See Carbajo, de Meza & Seidmann, supra note 85 (alternative proofs under Bertrand and
Cournot assumptions).
97 E.g., Greenlee, Reitman & Sibley, supra note 84, at 1132–33 (secondary market competi-
tive); Brennan, supra note 94 (secondary market monopolized prior to bundling; becomes duop-
oly with bundler after bundling starts).
98 See Erik Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, Complex Bundled Discounts and Antitrust
Policy, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 1227 (2009) [hereinafter Complex Bundled Discounts] (on bundles
whose products are used in variable proportions or that contain more than two products and
rivals produce differing subsets of the products).
99 See, e.g., Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 837
(1990) (bundling as entry deterrence device; monopolist would abandon bundling if entry
occurred).
100 See Eilat, Jayaratne, Ordover & Shaffer, supra note 95 (Elhauge result does not apply if
there are two or more potential entrants competing with one another).
101 See Crane, supra note 85, at 447–62.
102 See Einer Elhauge, How Loyalty Discounts can Perversely Discourage Discounting, 5 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 189 (2009) [hereinafter Loyalty Discounts] (assuming all the buyers
have the same demand function); Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, Complex Bundled Discounts,
supra note 98 (buyers purchase differing amounts of the secondary good).
103 E.g., Greenlee, Reitman & Sibley, supra note 84; Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, supra
note 85, at 468; see also AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 749d7 (Supp. 2011) (analyzing
such situations under “attribution” test for bundled discounts).
104 E.g., Elhauge, Loyalty Discounts, supra note 102; Einer Elhauge & Abraham L. Wickel-
gren, Robust Exclusion Through Loyalty Discounts (Harvard Law School Public Law & Legal
Theory Working Paper Series No. 10-15, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1544008. See Eilat, Jayaratne, Ordover & Shaffer, supra note 95, at 1 (exclu-
sionary results in the Elhauge model a consequence of most favored nation style clause rather
than from bundling as such).
98 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 78
whether the goods in a bundle are pure complements or are also partial substi-
tutes,105 and perhaps others.
Most of the models ignore production or distribution efficiencies. Many of
them also ignore avoidance of double marginalization in situations where the
secondary good is sold in a noncompetitive market. Those that find double
marginalization to obtain generally conclude that bundling results in higher
output and lower prices.106 The models typically assume an absolute monopo-
list in the primary (tying product); by contrast, most of the litigation involves
firms that have at least one rival. Many of the models are extraordinarily diffi-
cult to test in any manner that truly controls for all of the various assumptions,
and this is particularly true in situations where markets change over time.
Excessive generalization from any particular model can produce egregious
false positives.
Problematically, outcomes can also vary drastically for exactly the same
discount practice in the same market, but with different assumptions about
how rivals will respond. This fact can be important because antitrust litigation
involves an established market structure and proven bundling arrangements.
Any conclusions about economic or general welfare are critically dependent
on the range of rational rival responses, and these responses depend on our
assumptions about the costs of movement.
Tim Brennan has published a very useful exercise illustrating the array of
possible outcomes in a single monopolized market and involving a single dis-
count practice.107 Initially, firm A has a monopoly on product A and firm B a
monopoly on B, which are partial complements.108 Initially each firm has costs
of zero and sells its own product at a price of $0.50. Then A enters the B
market and sells A+B only as a bundle, and at a price of $1. In that case, if B
mindlessly continues to charge $0.50, the result is a welfare loss. Customers
that were previously buying one unit of each good are indifferent because they
can still obtain it at the price of $1 from A, rather than one unit from each
seller. Customers who value B by more than $0.50 but were not purchasing A
105 See Barry Nalebuff, Competing Against Bundles, in INCENTIVES, ORGANIZATION, AND PUB-
LIC ECONOMICS 323 (Peter J. Hammond & Gareth D. Myles eds., 2000) (finding lower prices and
higher output when the goods are partial substitutes).
106 See Randal Heeb, Innovation and Vertical Integration in Complementary Markets, 12 J.
ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 387 (2003) (bundling complements gives bundler higher output and
greater incentive to innovate, while reducing incentive of non-bundlers to innovate); Hovenkamp
& Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements, supra note 70 (tying that eliminates double marginalization
generally results in higher output and lower prices); Nalebuff, supra note 105 (when two prod-
ucts are sold separately by two firms that each have market power in one of the markets, bun-
dling by one firm leads to lower prices and higher output).
107 Brennan, supra note 94; see also Timothy J. Brennan, Bundled Rebates as Exclusion Rather
than Predation, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 335 (2008).
108 That is, some buyers purchase A and B together while others purchase each product alone.
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are also indifferent; they will keep right on purchasing B at $0.50. However,
customers who value A by more than $0.50 but were not purchasing B lose
because now they must purchase an unwanted B at a price of $0.50.
But this set of results depends critically on the twin facts that A neither
increases nor decreases the price when it bundles and that B simply keeps
right on charging the same price as it had before. This is hardly the most
likely assumption, and Brennan illustrates a large number of alternatives that
are at least as plausible. First of all, if A and B are complements and both pre-
bundling prices reflected some monopoly markup, then the profit maximizing
price of the bundle sold by a single firm will be lower than the pre-bundling
price. This is a consequence of eliminating double marginalization. Second, B
could be earning a significant markup and is likely to respond to any loss of
its own output with a price cut. Third, if B enters the A market and offers a
bundle itself, competition could drive both sellers’ pricing down, perhaps
even to the competitive level. In every scenario except the “mindless” one,
consumer surplus goes up. This even includes a scenario in which B responds
to A’s bundling by exiting the market altogether.109 Total surplus goes up in
every realistic situation.110
Such models are much simpler than any reality a court is likely to encoun-
ter, but that is partly the point. This particular model has “strong” assump-
tions—monopolies in both the primary and secondary market to start out and
a duopoly in one of the products after bundling commences. One objection to
it is that there could be more welfare deterioration if one of the markets were
more competitive to begin with. Perfect competition in the secondary market
does away with any gains from eliminating double marginalization. As a prac-
tical matter, however, a requirement of perfect competition in the secondary
market empties the set of anticompetitive outcomes as well. Further, any
above cost pricing in the secondary market will lead to double marginalization
under sales by separate firms. In addition to that, above cost prices in the
secondary market typically mean that firms in that market have some ability
to respond with their own price cuts.
Restricting the anticompetitive story to competitive secondary markets
would largely leave only franchise ties as worthy of concern, because they are
about the only ones that involve tied products priced close to marginal cost.
For franchises there is largely universal agreement that the ties are used as
109 By eliminating double marginalization A’s profit maximizing price for the AB bundle is
lower than A’s and B’s separate profit-maximizing prices prior to A’s entry into the B market.
110 In one of Professor Brennan’s alternative scenarios, if A sells the bundle at a price of $1,
which it is unlikely to do given double marginalization, and then if B cuts its price to the optimal
response level of $0.33, and if A continues to sell at $1 without a responsive price cut, then
consumers’ surplus will rise but producer profits will fall by a larger amount, yielding a welfare
loss. See Brennan, supra note 94.
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royalty substitutes or quality control devices and, in any event, tying product
market power is a rarity.111
Some recent decisions have embraced an “attribution” test for bundled dis-
counts, which was also recommended by the Antitrust Modernization Com-
mission.112 The test is designed to determine whether an A+B bundled
discount is capable of excluding a rival with identical costs but who makes
only product B. The test considers whether, when the entire discount is attrib-
uted to product B, the price of B falls below its costs. The test is arithmeti-
cally identical to asking whether the incremental price of B when included in
the bundle is sufficient to cover B’s costs. For example, if I sell a standalone
computer for $400 but a computer + printer package for $450, then the attri-
bution test shows exclusion if the $50 increment is less than the cost of the
printer. In that case an equally efficient rival who made only the printer could
not compete with the bundle.
The attribution test is a useful gatekeeper for excluding non-exclusionary
bundles. However, it produces one very perverse false positive: if the secon-
dary good is very close to the competitive price, then nearly any discount
flunks the test. So, for example, if I own a monopoly salt injection machine
and offer a bundled discount for those agreeing to take my salt, the bundle
excludes all rivals who make only salt if the price of salt is currently at cost.
So the more competitive the secondary market, the easier it is to show “exclu-
sion” under the test.
111 See, e.g., Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 433 (3d Cir. 1997)
(tied product was pizza dough; dismissing complaint based on “contract lock-in” theory of
power); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971) (tying of cookers and sup-
plies by non-dominant franchisor; franchise fee was zero but tied products were sold at above
market prices; illegality found); Burda v. Wendy’s Int’l, Inc., 659 F. Supp. 2d 928 (S.D. Ohio
2009) (non-monopoly franchisor; tied product was hamburger buns; sustaining complaint based
on contract lock-in theory of market power); Martrano v. Quizno’s Franchise Co., LLC, 2009
WL 1704469 (W.D. Pa. June 15, 2009) (unpublished opinion) (non-dominant fast food
franchisor; tied product was unspecified supplies and services; dismissing complaint for failing
to allege appropriate relevant market); William Cohen & Son, Inc. v. All American Hero, Inc.,
693 F. Supp. 201 (D.N.J. 1988) (denying summary judgment; tied product was steak sandwich
meat). Cf. Sheridan v. Marathon Petroleum Co., LLC, 530 F.3d 590 (9th Cir. 2008) (tied product
was credit card processing services, which are presumably sold competitively; affirming dismis-
sal of complaint for lack of allegations of monopoly power). Other cases are discussed in
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 22, § 10.6.
112 See, e.g., Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 906–07 (9th Cir. 2008)
(applying attribution test and dismissing complaint; health facility bundling primary, secondary,
tertiary care); see ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 99
(2007), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/toc.htm; see also
3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 749d (3d ed. 2008 & Supp.) (discussing other
decisions); Erik Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusionary Bundled Discounts and the
Antitrust Modernization Commission, 53 ANTITRUST BULL. 517 (2008).
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The extent of the possibility of false positives is readily appreciated when
one considers that the inclusion of an additional good at less than incremental
cost is nothing more than a price cut. For example, an automobile seller might
sweeten the deal for a hesitant buyer by throwing in rustproofing at no charge
or at a price less than its cost. Under the attribution test, ordinary competition
becomes a case of anticompetitive bundling.113
Antitrust policy should never reason from the idiosyncratic to the general
except with extraordinary caution. A good example is bundled discount mod-
els showing anticompetitive harm when a monopolist in a primary product
bundles and at about the same time increases the standalone price of the mo-
nopolized good.114 The monopolist then offers a bundled discount that brings
the price back down to roughly the pre-bundle level. Such bundling is profita-
ble to the monopolist if its losses from the standalone sales in the A product,
which is now priced at higher than the profit-maximizing level, are less than
the gains from the increased sales of the B product.
Assuming that such a strategy exists, and it very well may, it would still be
a very serious error to presume that any bundle whose introduction is accom-
panied by a price increase in the A product is such a case.115 After all, the test
does not simply require a price increase in the A product; it requires that this
increase be part of a strategy of charging more than the standalone profit-
maximizing price for A. Further, in a world where inflation is the norm nearly
all prices increase from time to time. In addition, the exclusionary power of
the strategy is crucially sensitive to whether the bundle is sold in fixed or
variable proportions.
To illustrate, a monopolist in product A has costs of $7 and a standalone
profit-maximizing price of $10. B is sold in a moderately competitive market
by both the monopolist and an equally efficient rival whose costs are $5, and
at a standalone price of $6. The monopolist raises the standalone price of A
113 See 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 749c.
114 See Greenlee, Reitman & Sibley, supra note 84, at 1138; id. at n.27.
115 For example, Professor Elhauge recommends a rule approaching per se illegality for tying
accompanied by a price increase in the tying product, with no query into whether the price is
above the standalone profit-maximizing level, nor into whether the tie is of fixed or variable
proportions:
The Appropriate Test.—When the linking product’s unbundled price exceeds its but-
for price, bundled discounts have the same power effects as ties and thus should be
treated like ties by applying a similar quasi-per se rule that bases liability on linking
market power unless the defendant proves offsetting efficiencies. The same exception
should also apply for products used or bundled in a fixed ratio that lack separate utility,
with such cases instead governed by a traditional rule of reason that requires proof of a
substantial foreclosure share or effect.
See Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, supra note 85, at 468. Elhauge concedes that “determin-
ing the but-for price can be difficult,” but suggests that internal documents might reveal it. Id.
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from $10 to $13 but bundles B at a price of $3, or a total of $16 for the A+B
bundle. So while the standalone price of A increases, the price of the bundle
remains unchanged. In this particular case the rival is excluded because it
would have to charge a below cost price of $3 for B in order to match the
bundle. The bundled price of $16 is well above A’s costs of 7 + 5, or $12.
Consumer welfare is reduced. Those who buy standalone A are worse off and
those who buy the bundle are indifferent. Whether the strategy is profitable to
the monopolist depends on whether its losses from charging too high a price
for A are offset by its gains from greater sales of B.
The whole story falls apart, however, if buyers purchase B in variable pro-
portions.116 In the above example each sale of an additional B at the bundled
price of $3 reduces the seller’s margin by $2. For example, if the buyer
wanted one A and four B the price would be 13 + 4*3, or $25. Here the
seller’s costs would be $7 for the single A and 20 for the four Bs, so the
dominant firm would lose money. This observation is very important because
the bundled discount cases of which I am aware, including the many cases in
medical device purchase markets, specify the bundled price but permit the
customer to choose the proportion.117
Finally, one must consider just how widespread bundling strategies that
involve price increases in the primary product really are. The question is not
often answered in tying decisions because the per se rule makes the answer
irrelevant. However, the decisions that incidentally report on prices, going
back more than a century, uniformly find that the defendant reduced rather
than increased the tying product price as part of the tying arrangement.118
Some of these arrangements involved bundled discounts, which means that
the defendant used a lower price rather than an absolute contractual require-
ment to tie the goods together.119 In some, the defendant reduced the tying
product price to cost or less, and sometimes even to zero.120 One recent deci-
sion involving computer printers observed from the record that printer manu-
116 See Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, Complex Bundled Discounts, supra note 98, at 1247–50.
117 E.g., Southeast Mo. Hosp. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 642 F.3d 608 (8th Cir. 2011).
118 The decisions are collected in Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements, supra note
70, at n.76. One important example is the well-known A.B. Dick case, which went to the Su-
preme Court in 1912. See A.B. Dick Co. v. Henry, 149 F. 424, 425 (C.C.N.Y. 1907) (“The
evidence establishes that the complainants sell the machines at a loss, less than the actual cost of
making, relying on sales of supplies therefor for a profit. The complainants have sold about
11,000 of these machines under this license restriction.”).
119 See, e.g., Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 830 (E.D.
Ky. 2007) (printer manufacturer received lower price for cartridges subject to a restriction requir-
ing a single use and replacement with another Lexmark cartridge than if sold without the
restriction).
120 E.g., Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971) (tying product price of
zero).
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facturers who bundle cartridges generally pursue a strategy of charging low
printer prices, sometimes less than cost, and higher prices for the cartridges.121
In sum, the case law suggests that bundling strategies that involve very high
prices for monopoly goods (higher than the standalone monopoly price) are
quite exceptional. The traditional price discrimination model based on a price
reduction in the primary good and increase in the second good is far more
robust. However, that model generally suggests higher output and probably
higher consumer welfare as well.122
Another situation where broad conclusions have been drawn from highly
specified models is loyalty, or market share, discounts. These discounts are
heavily used in GPO purchasing contracts for hospitals and were also one
subject of the FTC’s case against Intel.123 Several of the models referred to
previously have illustrated situations in which loyalty discounts might result
in higher prices by decreasing the range of options available to rivals and thus
making them less competitive. But the assumptions in these models are re-
strictive and they cannot be applied without significant risk of a false signal in
situations that deviate from their assumptions.
In many of the markets where loyalty discounts are most typically found,
they have a sensible explanation rooted in cost analysis that cannot be set
aside: they enable firms with significant fixed costs to bid lower prices in
exchange for higher anticipated output. For example, if fixed development
costs for a computer chip are $1 million and variable production costs are
$100 per chip, the seller’s breakeven price is $1100 per chip if it can predict
sales of 1000 chips, $300 per chip if it can predict sales of 5000 chips, $200
per chip if it can predict sales of 10,000, and so on. A firm’s ability to bid a
lower price depends critically on its estimate of sales. While the seller is not
in a position to control overall market demand, loyalty discounts may be a
way of guaranteeing a higher output from individual buyers. This rationale for
loyalty discounts is intuitively robust; that is, it tracks the fact that goods
subject to such discounts are frequently subject to substantial fixed develop-
ment costs in relation to a relatively short product life (e.g., microprocessors,
medical devices). This is a problem of the nontransactional costs produced by
asset specificity and economies of scale. Further, it is robust in the sense that
121 Xerox Corp. v. Media Sci., Inc., 660 F. Supp. 2d 535, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“As is true of
other printer manufacturers, Xerox generally sells its printers at a low margin or a loss, hoping to
earn a profit through later sales of high margin ink.”).
122 See Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements, supra note 70.
123 On the Intel settlement, see Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Settles Charges of
Anticompetitive Conduct Against Intel (Aug. 4, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/
2010/08/intel.shtm; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, The FTC’s Anticompetitive Pricing Case
Against Intel, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Vol. 2, No. 2, Winter 2010; Herbert Hovenkamp, The
Federal Trade Commission and the Sherman Act, 62 FLA. L. REV. 871 (2010).
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it does not depend on a great many additional assumptions about market struc-
ture, customer homogeneity, customer size distribution, and the like. As a
result, such discounts are used by both dominant and nondominant firms. The
result is higher output and lower prices and does not depend on exclusion of
anyone, although exclusion of firms that cannot attain the same cost level may
be a consequence.
As these various examples indicate, any antitrust evaluation of discount
strategies must take into account the full range of responses available to both
rivals and consumers. This requires consideration of the full range of costs,
both transactional and otherwise. Rivals who lack any ability to enter comple-
mentary markets or reconfigure their products may exist, but those facts
should never be presumed. The same thing generally applies to consumers.
The bundled discount models tend to show larger welfare losses as the second
market is more competitive, but it is precisely in competitive markets where
both rivals and customers have the larger array of alternative options.
VI. CONCLUSION
All important economic decisions have costs. Even doing nothing is costly
when other options would have produced a different result. Historically, anti-
trust structuralism tended to exaggerate these costs and as a result tended to
understate the ability of markets to correct for actions with potentially harmful
results. On the other side, Chicago School analysis tended to understate the
cost of moving resources and thus underappreciate the costs of collusive and
particularly exclusionary practices. Since the 1970s transaction cost econom-
ics has served to close this gap, greatly enriching our understanding of why
firms in differentiated markets behave as they do. The result has put to rest
many of our worst fears about threats to competition, but has left an important
residual where harm is possible. Transaction costs are not the only ones rele-
vant to this analysis, however. The movement of resources is costly for rea-
sons that have little or nothing to do with transacting, and these costs continue
to be equally relevant to policy analysis.
